Truthful online auctions for pricing peer-to-peer services

author: Po-An Chen and Tyng-Ruey Chuang
publication date: July 2005
cite this with: Po-An Chen and Tyng-Ruey Chuang. Truthful online auctions for pricing peer-to-peer services. In 7th International IEEE Conference on E-Commerce Technology 2005 (IEEE CEC), pages 59-66. München, Germany. July 2005.
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We consider truthful online auctions that aim at optimizing sellers’ revenues, representing service contributors’ satisfactions, as a general model for pricing peer-to-peer services under the assumption of individual service consumer’s rationality. For services that are in unlimited supply, we design a randomized truthful online auction with guaranteed revenue based on a randomized truthful offline auction. It is shown that the expected revenue extracted by our truthful online auction over all random factors achieves a (1) approximation ratio relative to the optimal single-price revenue under some reasonable assumption about the input bids. Since a peer must serve others to earn sufficient revenue that can cover its payment for being served, we argue that our online truthful auctions can be suitable schemes for incentivizing peer nodes in peer-to-peer systems to share, and thereby addressing the “free-rider” problem in peerto- peer service sharing.

papers:cec05:home Last modified: 2007/10/19 16:41